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THE DICHOTOMY BETWEEN INDEPENDENT AND CUMULATIVE
REASONS FOR AN ADVERSE ACTION: A NEW DEFENSE FOR EMPLOYERS
TO CLAIMS OF WORKPLACE DISCRIMINATION
DHRUBA MUKHERJEE1
PART I:

INTRODUCTION

Fifteen years ago, in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products Inc., the
United States Supreme Court addressed the evidentiary burden borne by plaintiffs
who seek to use indirect evidence to prove intentional discrimination. 2 The Court
clarified that if a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination and
discredits all of an employer’s non-discriminatory reasons for the adverse action,
the trier of fact is permitted to find pretext, i.e., that the employer’s business
justification is a pretext for wrongful discrimination).3 However, the Court failed
to clarify whether a fact-finder may find pretext when only some of the employer’s
non-discriminatory reasons are discredited. As of today, the Supreme Court has
yet to determine whether a plaintiff can demonstrate pretext by only discrediting
some, not all, of the employer’s proffered non-discriminatory reasons. Therefore,
in such a situation, a fact-finder must look to the case-law developed by the United
States Courts of Appeals. This paper will explore how the Sixth Circuit has
attempted to address this issue, particularly in the context of the Mine Act.
In Sims v. Cleland, the Sixth Circuit held that when an employer offers
multiple “alternative and independent” reasons for an adverse action, the falsity of
1
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one such reason may not impeach the credibility of any other reason.4 However,
the court failed to indicate how to distinguish reasons that are “alternative and
independent” from reasons that are not. Equally important, the court failed to
clarify whether, if the employer’s reasons are not independent, the falsity of one
reason will necessarily impeach the credibility of the remaining reasons.5 In 2010,
the Sixth Circuit clarified these unresolved issues in Pendley v. Federal Mine
Safety and Health Review Commission,6 a case decided under the Federal Mine
Safety and Health Act of 1977 (“the Mine Act”).7
The Mine Act prohibits an employer, known as a mine operator, from
retaliating against a miner because the miner engaged in protected activity.8 Under
the Mine Act, a miner can establish a prima facie case of discrimination by proving
that his protected activity was a motivating factor in the adverse action. However,
the mine operator can avoid all liability by proving an affirmative defense, i.e., that
even in the absence of protected activity, the miner would have suffered the same
adverse action for his unprotected misconduct.9 The Federal Mine Safety and
Health Review Commission (“the Commission”) is an independent adjudicative
agency which interprets the Mine Act. 10
In Pendley v. Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission
(“FMSHRC”), the Sixth Circuit found that the three non-discriminatory reasons
offered by the mine operator were not alternative and independent but cumulative.

4

Sims v. Cleland, 813 F.2d 790, 793 (6th Cir. 1987).

5

Id.

6

Pendley v. Fed. Mine Safety and Health Review Comm’n, 601 F.3d 417, 425-426
(6th Cir. 2010).
7

30 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. (2012).

8

See id. § 815(c)(1).

9

See Sec’y of Labor ex rel. Pasula v. Consolidation Coal Co., 2 F.M.S.H.R.C.
2786, 2799-2800 (1980), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Consolidation Coal Co.
v. Marshall, 663 F.2d 1211 (3d Cir. 1981).
10

Citations to Commission decisions will follow the Commission’s citation
manual. Such citations will cite to specific volumes of the Commission’s bluebook,
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The court then held that if all reasons are cumulative, they must all be credible. 11
In other words, where the operator articulates two or more cumulative reasons, the
falsity of one will impeach the credibility of the remaining reasons. Cumulative
reasons thus have the exact opposite effect from alternative and independent
reasons.
The Sixth Circuit’s distinction between independent and cumulative reasons
provides a set of incentives for employers. By strategically framing their nondiscriminatory reasons as independent or cumulative, employers can utilize a
loophole to secure an advantage in the affirmative defense analysis. However, it
may be possible to close this loophole by eliminating an employer’s ability to
dictate whether its non-discriminatory reasons are treated as independent or
cumulative.
Part I will summarize the purpose of the Mine Act, and will discuss the main
Commission decisions regarding retaliation under the Mine Act. Part II will
discuss the Sixth Circuit’s decisions regarding independent and cumulative reasons
for an adverse action. Part III will discuss how employers may be able to utilize a
loophole in the dichotomy between independent and cumulative reasons. Further,
Part III will propose a means by which the Commission may resolve this loophole.
Broadly speaking, the paper looks at the development, and consequences, of
the Sixth Circuit’s distinction between independent and cumulative reasons for an
adverse action. In the future, the Sixth Circuit may apply the dichotomy of
independent and cumulative reasons to other federal non-discrimination statutes.
Part IV will briefly consider whether the principles outlined in this paper are
broadly applicable in other contexts. In this regard, perhaps the paper could serve
as a guide to federal courts which seek to implement a similar distinction in the
context of other statutes.

PART I: THE MINE ACT
I.A.

Background and Purpose

Congress passed the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 (“the Mine
Act”) to consolidate the federal regulations regarding mining into a single
12

11

Pendley, 601 F.3d at 425-426.

12

30 U.S.C. § 801.
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statutory scheme. 13 The Mine Act seeks to ensure the safety and health of miners
by preventing mine accidents that result in injuries or fatalities. 14 The Act directs
the Secretary of Labor “to develop and promulgate improved mandatory health or
safety standards to protect the health and safety of the Nation’s coal or other
miners” and requires that mine operators and miners comply with such standards.15
Under the Mine Act, the Mine Safety and Health Administration (“MSHA”),
an agency in the Department of Labor, promulgates and enforces mine health and
safety standards. MSHA employs numerous inspectors who periodically inspect
mines. If an inspector determines that an operator has violated any of MSHA’s
mandatory standards, he will issue a citation to the operator. The citation will
describe the violation of the relevant standard and will require the operator to
“abate” (fix) the violation. In certain situations, the inspector may also issue an
order requiring that miners be removed from a hazardous area until the hazard has
been removed. After the inspector issues a citation or order, MSHA will generally
propose a penalty (fine) to the operator as a result of the violation. 16
The Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission, an independent
adjudicative agency, adjudicates disputes between MSHA and mine operators
regarding the validity of citations, orders, and penalties. The Commission is
comprised of an Office of Administrative Law Judges, which decides cases at the
trial level (without a jury), and a Review Commission, which provides appellate
review of judges’ decisions.17 The Review Commission is comprised of five
Commissioners appointed by the President. Final Review Commission decisions
13

The Mine Act was amended by the Mine Improvement and New Emergency
Response Act of 2006 (“MINER Act”), Pub. L. 109-236. Any reference to the
Mine Act will refer to the amended version of the Act.
14

Mine Safety and Health Admin., History of Mine Safety and Health Legislation,
MSHA.GOV, http://www.msha.gov/MSHAINFO/MSHAINF2.HTM (last visited
Dec. 19, 2013).
15

30 U.S.C. §§ 801(g)(1)-(2).

16

Fed. Mine Safety and Health Review Comm’n, Guide to Commission
Proceedings, FMSHRC.GOV, http://www.fmshrc.gov/guides/guide-commissionproceedings (last visited Dec. 20, 2013).
17

Id. (providing further that Review Commission decisions form precedent for the
administrative law judges of the Commission; however, a decision by a
Commission judge is merely persuasive, and not binding on the other judges).
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are appealed to the United States Courts of Appeals.18 As the Commission
adjudicates disputes under the Mine Act, it is not bound by federal court decisions
which address issues under other federal statutes. However, decisions by the
United States Courts of Appeals interpreting other statutes, such as Title VII, may
have persuasive value.
In addition to MSHA inspectors, the Mine Act also relies on miners to report
violations of mandatory safety standards that create unsafe working conditions.
The miners may report such violations either to their supervisors or to MSHA. As
the Commission has stated:
MSHA inspectors cannot be everywhere at once, nor can
they be expected to be so familiar with every mine that
they will become aware of every condition or practice in
need of correction. The successful enforcement of the
1977 Mine Act is therefore particularly dependent upon
the voluntary efforts of miners to notify either MSHA
officials or the operator of conditions or practices that
require correction.19
However, operators may often attempt to discourage miners from making
safety complaints by disciplining miners who complain about unsafe working
conditions. If operators were allowed to freely retaliate against miners who made
safety complaints, miners would be very reluctant to complain about safety
hazards. Congress recognized and addressed this issue in the Mine Act by
enacting section 105(c), commonly known as the anti-retaliation provision of the
Mine Act.
Section 105(c) is comprised of three sub-sections. Section 105(c)(1)
prohibits an operator from retaliating against a miner because the miner engaged in
an activity protected under the Mine Act, such as making a complaint about unsafe
working conditions.20 Section 105(c)(2) permits a miner to file a complaint with
18

Id.

19

Sec’y of Labor ex rel. Pasula v. Consolidation Coal Co., 2 F.M.S.H.R.C. 2786,
2790 (1980), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Consolidation Coal Co. v. Marshall,
663 F.2d 1211 (3d Cir. 1981).
20

30 U.S.C. § 815(c)(1) (1977) (stating in relevant part that “no person shall
discharge or in any manner discriminate against or cause to be discharged or cause
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MSHA alleging retaliation.21 If, after an investigation, MSHA determines that the
operator engaged in discrimination, an attorney from the Department of Labor will
represent the miner at the subsequent hearing before an administrative law judge of
the Commission. However, under section 105(c)(3), even if MSHA determines
that the operator did not violate section 105(c)(1), the miner can independently
pursue a claim of discriminatory retaliation before the Commission.22 In a
105(c)(3) action, the miner is represented by private counsel, or represents himself
pro se.
I.B.

Retaliation under the Mine Act

In 1980, the Review Commission set forth the framework for analyzing
claims of retaliation under the Mine Act. In Pasula v. Consolidation Coal, the
Review Commission considered whether to adopt the “in any part” test or the “but
for” test to determine whether an operator engaged in unlawful discrimination.23
Under the former test, a plaintiff can establish prohibited discrimination by
showing that his protected activity was a motivating factor for the adverse action.
Under the latter test, a plaintiff can establish prohibited discrimination only by
showing that he would not have suffered the adverse action but for his protected
activity.
There are advantages and disadvantages to using each test. The “in any
part” test is easier for employees to satisfy, but may protect employees who would
have been fired in any event for their unprotected misconduct. The “but for” test
returns the employee to the position he would have occupied if he had not engaged
in protected activity, but is a much harder test which may deter other employees
discrimination against or otherwise interfere with the exercise of the statutory
rights of any miner, representative of miners or applicant for employment in any
coal or other mine subject to this Act because such miner, representative of miners
or applicant for employment has filed or made a complaint under or related to this
Act, including a complaint notifying the operator or the operator’s agent, or the
representative of the miners at the coal or other mine of an alleged danger or safety
or health violation in a coal or other mine”).
21

Id. § 815(c)(2).

22

Id. § 815(c)(3).

23

Pasula, 2 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 2797-2800.
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from filing claims of discrimination.24 In Pasula, the Review Commission adopted
elements from both tests.
The Review Commission stated that a miner can establish a prima facie case
of retaliation under the Mine Act by demonstrating by a preponderance of the
evidence that: (1) he engaged in activity protected under the Mine Act and that (2)
the adverse action25 was motivated in any part by his protected activity. The miner
bears the burden of production and persuasion in proving his prima facie case.26
However, the Review Commission also stated that an operator may affirmatively
defend by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) the adverse action
was motivated by both the miner’s protected and unprotected activities and that (2)
the operator would have taken the adverse action for the miner’s unprotected
misconduct alone. In essence, the employer must prove that the protected activity
was not the “but for” cause of the adverse action. 27 The operator bears the burden

24

Id. at 2797-98.

25

This paper will focus on adverse actions that take the form of disciplinary
actions, issued to an employee for specific instances of misconduct. When an
employer issues a disciplinary action, the employee is given a letter of discipline,
which lists non-discriminatory reasons for the adverse action.
26

Pasula, 2 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 2799; see also Sec’y of Labor ex rel. Chacon v.
Phelps Dodge Corp., 3 F.M.S.H.R.C. 2508, 2510-11 (1981), rev’d on other
grounds sub nom. Donovan v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 709 F.2d 86 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(noting that the Commission has permitted miners to establish a prima facie case
through the use of indirect evidence; indirect evidence of a causal connection
between the protected activity and the adverse action may include: (1) coincidence
in time between the protected activity and the adverse action, (2) the operator’s
knowledge of the protected activity, (3) the operator’s hostility or animus towards
the protected activity, and (4) disparate treatment of the plaintiff).
27

See Sec’y of Labor ex rel. Robinette v. United Castle Coal Co., 3 F.M.S.H.R.C.
803, 818 n.20 (1981) (providing that under the Mine Act, an operator may also
attempt to rebut a prima facie case, by showing either that the miner did not
engage in protected activity or that the adverse action was not motivated by the
miner’s protected activity; whether the operator rebuts the prima facie case or
establishes an affirmative defense, the effect under the Mine Act is the same – the
operator avoids all liability for the adverse action; thus, given that an affirmative
defense is easier to prove but has the same effect as a rebuttal, it is reasonable to
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of production and persuasion in proving an affirmative defense.28 If the operator
establishes an affirmative defense, there is no violation of section 105(c), and the
operator avoids all liability for the adverse action.29
The Review Commission integrated the “in any part” test into the miner’s
prima facie case to prevent “the imposition upon the complainant of what may be
an impossible burden to shoulder.”30 The Review Commission integrated the “but
for” test into the operator’s affirmative defense to ensure that a miner is returned to
the same position he would have occupied if he had not engaged in protected
activity, instead of being placed in a more favorable position.31 The Review
Commission has recognized that an operator must show that “he did in fact
consider the employee deserving of discipline for engaging in the unprotected
activity alone and that [the operator] would have disciplined [the employee] in any
event.”32
The Review Commission has explained that an affirmative defense should
not be “examined superficially or be approved automatically once offered.”33 In
reviewing affirmative defenses, an administrative law judge must “determine
whether [the reasons proffered by the operator] are credible and, if so, whether
they would have motivated the particular operator as claimed.”34 In regards to
showing that an affirmative defense is pre-textual, the Review Commission has
held that “pretext may be found . . . where the asserted [business] justification is
infer that most claims of retaliation under the Mine Act hinge on the operator’s
affirmative defense).
28

Pasula, 2 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 2799-2800.

29

See generally Robinette, 3 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 818 n.20 (stating in relevant part that
“if a complainant who has established a prima facie case cannot refute an
operator’s meritorious affirmative defense, the operator prevails”); see also
Chacon, 3 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 2517-18 (noting even though the plaintiff established a
prima facie case, the complaint was dismissed because the operator established an
affirmative defense).
30

Pasula, 2 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 2800.

31

Id.

32

Id.

33

Haro v. Magma Copper Co., 4 F.M.S.H.R.C. 1935, 1938 (1982).

34

Bradley v. Belva Coal Co., 4 F.M.S.H.R.C. 982, 993 (1982).
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weak, implausible, or out of line with the operator's normal business practices.”35
However, the Review Commission has also held that in evaluating whether an
affirmative defense is pre-textual, “our judges should not substitute for the
operator’s business judgment our views on good business practice.”36
Taking cues from a Sixth Circuit decision interpreting other federal nondiscrimination statutes, the Review Commission further analyzed the issue of
pretext in Turner v. National Cement.37 In Turner, the Review Commission listed
two ways in which a miner can show that the operator’s affirmative defense is not
credible but rather a pretext for prohibited discrimination. First, a miner can
establish that the operator’s proffered reason(s) for the adverse action have no
basis in fact, i.e., that they are factually false. Second, a miner can show that the
proffered reason(s) did not actually motivate the adverse action. 38 In this regard,
the miner admits the factual basis underlying the operator’s proffered reason(s),
and that such conduct could motivate dismissal, but attacks the credibility of the
proffered reason(s) indirectly by showing circumstances which tend to prove that
an illegal motivation was more likely than the legitimate business reason(s)
proffered by the operator. 39

35

Sec'y of Labor ex rel. Price v. Jim Walter Res., Inc. 12 F.M.S.H.R.C. 1521, 1534
(1990).
36

Sec’y of Labor ex rel. Chacon v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 3 F.M.S.H.R.C. 2508,
2516 (1981), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Donovan v. Phelps Dodge Corp.,
709 F.2d 86 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
37

Turner v. Nat’l Cement Co., 33 F.M.S.H.R.C. 1059, 1073 (2011) (citing Madden
v. Chattanooga City Wide Serv. Dep’t, 549 F.3d 666, 675 (6th Cir. 2008)).
38
39

Id.

Turner, 33 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 1073-1077 (noting a third approach for
demonstrating pretext; a miner can demonstrate pretext by showing that the
employer’s proffered non-discriminatory reason(s) were insufficient to motivate
the adverse action, i.e., other employees did not suffer the same adverse action
even though they engaged in conduct substantially similar to that which formed the
basis of the adverse action at issue. The Review Commission implicitly suggested
that all circumstantial evidence of discrimination should be analyzed under the
second approach, indirectly limiting the third approach to direct evidence of
disparate treatment).
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The most recognized federal non-discrimination statute is Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.40 Therefore, it is instructive to compare the burdenshifting framework of the Mine Act’s anti-retaliation provision to the burdenshifting frameworks of Title VII’s anti-retaliation and status-based discrimination
provisions. In this paper, status-based discrimination will refer to discrimination
based on a protected status such as the employee’s race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.
In contrast to the Mine Act, a plaintiff who claims retaliation under Title VII
41
must establish that his protected activity was a “but for” cause of the adverse
action.42 In this regard, he bears the burden of persuasion to establish that he
would not have suffered the adverse action in the absence of his protected activity.
As previously discussed, under the Mine Act the employer bears the burden of
persuasion regarding but for causation. In this regard, after the plaintiff establishes
a prima facie case, the employer must prove, as part of its affirmative defense, that
the protected activity was not the “but for” cause of the adverse action.
In contrast to the Mine Act, a plaintiff can prove “status-based
discrimination” under Title VII under a lessened causation standard. A plaintiff
can prove such discrimination by simply establishing that his protected status was
a motivating factor in the adverse action.43 After the plaintiff makes such a
showing, he is entitled to declaratory relief and attorney’s fees, regardless of the
employer’s affirmative defense. While the employer can defend by showing that
the plaintiff would have suffered the adverse action in any event for his
unprotected activities, a credible affirmative defense only precludes liability for
compensatory damages and reinstatement.44 When a plaintiff claims status-based
40

42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (2012).

41

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2012).

42

Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013).

43

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (“An unlawful employment practice is established when
the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors
also motivated the practice.”)
44

Id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(b) (“On a claim in which an individual proves a violation
under [42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)] and a respondent demonstrates that the respondent
would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating
factor, the court – (i) may grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief and, (ii)
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discrimination, the affirmative defense is part of the remedy stage of litigation.
This stage is only reached after the plaintiff has already proven a violation, i.e.,
that his protected status was a motivating factor in the adverse action. Therefore,
since the plaintiff has already proven discrimination, a successful affirmative
defense does not preclude liability for attorney’s fees. In contrast, when a plaintiff
claims retaliation under the Mine Act, the affirmative defense is part of the
violation or liability stage of litigation. In this regard, the plaintiff must discredit
an employer’s affirmative defense to prove discrimination. Therefore, a successful
defense precludes all liability.
It is easier for a plaintiff to establish prohibited status-based discrimination
under Title VII than prohibited retaliation under the Mine Act. A plaintiff can
establish status-based discrimination by simply showing that his protected status
was a motivating factor in the adverse action. In contrast, a plaintiff can only
establish retaliation under the Mine Act by showing that his protected activity was
a motivating factor in the adverse action AND that the employer’s affirmative
defense is not credible.

PART II: THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
In Pendley v. FMSHRC, the Sixth Circuit clarified how the Commission
must review claims of retaliation under the Mine Act. The court considered
whether a plaintiff can show that an operator’s justification, comprised of multiple
non-discriminatory reasons for an adverse action, is pre-textual when only some of
the reasons are found to be false. The court concluded that if the reasons are
alternative and independent, the plaintiff can show pretext only by demonstrating
that all the reasons are not credible. Conversely, if the reasons are cumulative, the
plaintiff can show pretext by simply demonstrating that one of the reasons is not
credible. In this regard, the Sixth Circuit built on principles it had earlier laid
down in Sims v. Cleland.
II.A.

Sims v. Cleland

attorney’s fees and costs demonstrated to be directly attributable only to the pursuit
of a claim under [42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)]; and (iii) shall not award damages or
issue an order requiring any admission, reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or
payment, described in subparagraph (A).”)
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In Sims v. Cleland, the Sixth Circuit adjudicated claims of sex and age-based
discrimination under Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
196745 respectively. 46 During the bench trial in the district court, the plaintiff
claimed she suffered discrimination when she was passed over for promotion in
favor of a younger male co-worker. The employer claimed 1) that the plaintiff was
not qualified for the promotion and 2) that the employer believed in good faith that
the other individual was more qualified due to his attitude and work habits. The
district court, while finding the former reason to be false, held that there was no
discrimination since the latter reason was the true reason for the adverse action.
The issue before the Sixth Circuit was whether, if an employer proffers multiple
non-discriminatory reasons for an adverse action, the falsity of one reason
mandates a finding of pretext.47
The Sixth Circuit recognized that if an employer only offers a single nondiscriminatory reason, which is proven false, the fact-finder is only left with
circumstantial inferences that the employer was motivated by discriminatory
animus. In such a situation, the court held that the plaintiff must prevail.
However, the court added that “it is not merely the falsity or incorrectness of the
articulated reason that gives rise to the conclusion of pretext; rather, it is the
resulting absence of legitimate explanation for the suspect employment decision
that warrants the finding of discrimination.”48 This principle implies that when an
employer proffers multiple non-discriminatory reasons for an adverse action, as
long as one of the reasons is credible, there is a legitimate explanation for the
discipline. Therefore, in such a scenario, the court should not find discrimination.
However, the Sixth Circuit further stated, “where two or more alternative
and independent legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons are articulated by the
defendant employer, the falsity or incorrectness of one may not impeach the
credibility of the remaining articulated reason(s).”49 In this regard, the court
limited the principle that one reason may not impeach the credibility of another to

45

29 U.S.C. § 623 (2012).

46

Sims v. Cleland, 813 F.2d 790, 791 (6th Cir. 1987).

47

Id. at 791-793.

48

Id. at 793.

49

Id.
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“alternative and independent” reasons.50 However, the court failed to clarify how
to distinguish between reasons that are alternative and independent and reasons
that are not. The court also failed to clarify whether, if an employer’s justification
is comprised of multiple non-alternative and independent reasons, the falsity or
incorrectness of one will necessarily impeach the credibility of the remaining
reasons.51
The Sixth Circuit implicitly assumed, without further explanation, that the
two reasons proffered by the employer in the case at bar were alternative and
independent. Therefore, the court held that the falsity of the former reason did not
impeach the credibility of the latter reason. Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit affirmed
the district court’s finding that the employer’s business justification was not pretextual.
II.B.

Pendley v. FMSHRC

In 2010, the Sixth Circuit decided Pendley v. FMSHRC, which involved a
claim of retaliation under the Mine Act. In that case, the plaintiff miner was
terminated for three non-discriminatory reasons: 1) harassment of office staff, 2)
interference with safety check of a hoist potentially endangering the safety of those
conducting the test, and 3) assaulting another employee.52 The initial trial was
conducted before an administrative law judge of the Commission. The judge’s

50

Since the issue was whether the falsity of one alternative and independent reason
mandates a finding of pretext, the Sixth Circuit could have merely held that the
falsity of one independent reason does not necessarily impeach the credibility of
other reasons. Instead, the court held that the falsity of one alternative and
independent reason may not impeach the credibility of other reasons, resulting in a
bright line rule. See Sims, 813 F.2d at 793.
51

In Sims, the Sixth Circuit analyzed an employer’s business justification in the
context of rebuttals under the McDonnell-Douglas framework. However, the
distinction between reasons that are alternative and independent and reasons that
are not is equally applicable to the affirmative defense analysis. See Sims, 813 F.2d
at 793.
52

Pendley v. Fed. Mine Safety and Health Review Comm’n, 601 F.3d 417, 425426 (6th Cir. 2010).
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decision was appealed to the Commissioners of the Review Commission, and the
Review Commission’s subsequent decision was appealed to the Sixth Circuit.53
After the trial, the administrative law judge dismissed the miner’s complaint
since he found that the operator had rebutted the miner’s prima facie case of
discrimination.54 While the judge only found two of the three reasons proffered by
the employer to be credible, he found these two reasons to be sufficient to have
motivated the miner’s termination. Specifically, the judge stated that:
I do not find [the second reason, interference with safety
check of a hoist] crucial to the validity of the disciplinary
action. It was enough, in my view, that [the miner] was
involved in the oral altercation with the office employees
[(the first reason),] and the physical altercation with
[another employee] [(the third reason)].55
The Review Commission affirmed the judge’s decision, holding that “the
judge’s role in examining the reasons for [the miner’s] discharge under the Mine
Act does not require that [the judge] adopt every reason given by the operator in
order to sustain the discipline.”56 However, the Sixth Circuit disagreed, and in its
decision, further clarified the dichotomy between alternative and independent and
cumulative reasons for an adverse action.
On review, the Sixth Circuit distinguished alternative and independent
reasons from “cumulative reasons” for an adverse action. The court acknowledged
the Sims principle that “where two or more alternative and independent legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons are articulated by the defendant employer, the falsity or
incorrectness of one may not impeach the credibility of the remaining articulated

53

Id.

54

Sec’y of Labor ex rel. Pendley v. Highland Mining Co., 34 F.M.S.H.R.C. 1919,
1922 (2012) (the Review Commission on remand from the Sixth Circuit discussing
the judge’s decision).
55

Sec’y of Labor ex rel. Pendley v. Highland Mining Co., 30 F.M.S.H.R.C. 459,
495 n.43 (2008) (the original decision by the administrative law judge).
56

Pendley, 601 F.3d at 425-426 (citing Sec’y of Labor ex rel. Pendley v. Highland
Mining Co., 31 F.M.S.H.R.C. 61, 79 (2009) (the original decision by the Review
Commission appealed to the Sixth Circuit)).

132

THE LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW FORUM

[VOL. 5:1

reason(s).”57 However, the court further stated that the reasons at bar “have not
been shown to be alternative and independent reasons, but are, according to the
decision-maker’s testimony, cumulative reasons for termination.”58
The Sixth Circuit held that when the non-discriminatory reasons for an
adverse action are “cumulative,” each of the reasons must be credible.59 In other
words, when all reasons are cumulative, the falsity or incorrectness of one will
impeach the credibility of the remaining reasons.60 When all reasons are
impeached, the fact-finder will be left without any legitimate explanation for the
adverse action. And once there is an absence of any legitimate explanation, a
finding of discrimination is warranted. The court further recognized that to
distinguish reasons that are cumulative from reasons that are independent, the
viewpoint of the decision-maker is of paramount importance.
The Sixth Circuit found that if a decision-maker issues the disciplinary
action “based” on all of the enumerated reasons, the reasons are cumulative.61 In
this regard, the decision-maker views the combined reasons as justifying the
adverse action. Conversely, if the decision-maker views the reasons as being
independent bases for the disciplinary action, the reasons are alternative and
independent. According to the court, the decision-maker’s viewpoint can be
discerned from the structure of the letter of disciplinary action given to the
employee, and from the decision-maker’s testimony at trial.
As indicated above, the Sixth Circuit found that the non-discriminatory
reasons proffered by the employer in the case at bar were cumulative. Therefore,
all three reasons needed to be credible. However, the administrative law judge did
not examine the credibility of the second reason for the adverse action
(interference with safety check of a hoist). Therefore, the Sixth Circuit remanded
the case requiring the Commission to examine the credibility of the second reason
57

Id. at 426 n.4 (citing Cooley v. Carmike Cinemas, 25 F.3d 1325, 1329 (6th Cir.
1994) (quoting Sims v. Cleland, 813 F.2d 790, 793 (6th Cir. 1987))).
58

Id.

59

Id. at 425-26.

60

Id. at 431 n.4 (noting the distinction between alternative and independent and
cumulative reasons applies to the employer’s business justification, regardless of
whether the business justification is part of the employer’s rebuttal or affirmative
defense).
61

Id. at 425-29.
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before sustaining the disciplinary action and dismissing the complaint. On remand,
the Review Commission remanded the case to the administrative law judge to
determine the credibility of the second reason “in light of . . . the Court of Appeals
finding that in fact the three reasons given were cumulative rather than
independent.”62
As discussed above, the influence of Sims v. Cleland is apparent in the Sixth
Circuit’s decision. Less apparent is the influence of prior Commission case-law.
In Pendley v. FMSHRC, the Sixth Circuit claimed that the Review Commission
departed from its own precedent in holding that an adverse action can be sustained
even if some of the operator’s reasons are not credible. More precisely, the Sixth
Circuit claimed that under prior decisions by the Review Commission, “the
[Review] Commission may not disbelieve part of an operator’s justification [the
second reason] but nonetheless hold that in the [Review] Commission’s own
view[,] [another] part of the asserted justification [the first and third reasons] was
enough to support the adverse action.”63 In this regard, the Sixth Circuit implied
that Review Commission precedent dictated that all reasons for an adverse action
must be credible. However, it is highly ambiguous as to whether the Review
Commission’s prior case-law suggested that all reasons for an adverse action must
be found credible in order for the judge to sustain the disciplinary action.
The Sixth Circuit primarily relied on two decisions by the Review
Commission, Sec’y of Labor ex rel. Chacon v. Phelps Dodge Corp. and Sec’y of
Labor ex rel. McGill v. U.S. Steel.64 In Chacon, the Review Commission merely
held that an administrative law judge had improperly rejected an operator’s
affirmative defense by applying a subjective standard of fairness as to what

62

On remand, the Review Commission claimed that the Sixth Circuit remanded the
matter so that the Commission may examine the credibility of the second reason
for the termination. See Sec’y of Labor ex rel. Pendley v. Highland Mining Co., 34
F.M.S.H.R.C. 1919, 1926 (2012). It is unclear, however, whether this
interpretation of the Sixth Circuit’s decision was accurate. The Sixth Circuit
believed that the administrative law judge discredited the second reason, which
would preclude the need for the Commission to determine the credibility of that
reason. See Pendley, 601 F.3d at 426.
63

Pendley, 601 F.3d at 426.

64

Id. at 425.
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constituted an appropriate business practice.65 In McGill, the Review Commission
simply held that an administrative law judge may not substitute a different
affirmative defense for the one relied upon by the operator. 66 There was no
indication, in either case, that an administrative law judge must find all reasons
proffered by the operator to be credible in order to sustain the disciplinary action.
In addition, neither case distinguished between alternative and independent and
cumulative reasons for an adverse action.
Therefore, the Sixth Circuit arguably imposed its own principles to a claim
of retaliation under the Mine Act. First, the Sixth Circuit’s implicit presumption,
that under prior Review Commission case-law all non-discriminatory reasons must
be credible, is flawed. This claim relies on the debatable assumption that Chacon
and McGill held that all of the operator’s reasons must be found credible before an
adverse action may be sustained. Second, even if the first claim were supported by
the case-law, the Sixth Circuit’s distinction between alternative and independent
and cumulative reasons for an adverse action is unsupported by any decision by the
Review Commission. In this regard, the Sixth Circuit’s own interpretation of
Review Commission precedent contradicts the distinction between independent
and cumulative reasons. If prior Commission precedent holds that all reasons must
be credible in all circumstances, then it fails to distinguish between cumulative and
independent reasons.
Regardless, the Sixth Circuit may, in the near future, apply such principles to
other federal non-discrimination statutes.67 In Sims v. Cleland, the Sixth Circuit
65

Sec’y of Labor ex rel. Chacon v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 3 F.M.S.H.R.C. 2508,
2516-17 (1981), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Donovan v. Phelps Dodge Corp.,
709 F.2d 86 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
66

Sec’y of Labor ex rel. McGill v. U.S. Steel Mining Co., 23 F.M.S.H.R.C. 981,
987-89 (2001) (explaining that while the employer argued that the adverse action
was motivated by the employee’s insubordination and profanity, the administrative
law judge instead found that the adverse action was motivated by the employee’s
threat to file a grievance and other labor-contract related issues.)
67

The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Pendley may not apply in the same manner to all
federal non-discrimination statutes. Under the Mine Act, Review Commission
case-law strongly suggests that the falsity of an employer’s proffered business
justification mandates a finding of discrimination. In this regard, McGill holds that
the fact-finder is bound to the affirmative defense proffered by the employer. In
contrast, under other federal non-discrimination statutes, the falsity of an
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mentioned alternative and independent reasons in the context of status-based
discrimination under Title VII. An affirmative defense to a claim of status-based
discrimination may similarly consist of multiple non-discriminatory reasons for an
adverse action. Thus, the Sixth Circuit may apply, and perhaps even further
develop, the dichotomy between alternative and independent and cumulative
reasons in the context of status-based discrimination under Title VII.

PART III: MANIPULATING THE DICHOTOMY
III.A.

The Loophole

In light of the dichotomy between independent and cumulative reasons, the
Commission should use a two-tiered framework to determine whether an
operator’s affirmative defense is pre-textual. At the first tier, the Commission
should assess the credibility of each non-discriminatory reason proffered by the
operator. At the second tier, the Commission should assess the substantiality of the
affirmative defense, i.e., whether the operator’s non-discriminatory reasons are
substantial enough to motivate the adverse action in the absence of protected
activity. The new two-tiered framework will require a slight reformulation of the
Commission’s prior framework set forth in Turner.68
The first approach in Turner permits a miner to demonstrate pretext by
showing that the operator’s non-discriminatory reasons are factually false.69 In the
new framework, at the first tier, the fact-finder should continue to assess the factual
accuracy of each reason. In addition, the presiding administrative law judge
should determine whether each non-discriminatory reason reflects a violation of a

employer’s business justification may permit, rather than mandate, a finding of
discrimination. In this regard, under other federal non-discrimination statutes, a
fact-finder may substitute a different justification for the one proffered by the
employer. See generally Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133,
147-149 (2000). While Reeves was decided a year before McGill, the Review
Commission chose not to incorporate the Reeves principle into the burden shifting
framework of the Mine Act.
68

Turner v. Nat’l Cement Co., 33 F.M.S.H.R.C. 1059, 1073-77 (2011).

69

Id. at 1073.
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consistently enforced company policy.70 This will allow the judge to determine
whether each non-discriminatory reason is factually accurate and a credible basis
for any discipline. If the operator’s affirmative defense clears the first tier, the
judge should determine whether, under the second tier, the affirmative defense is
substantial enough to motivate the discipline at issue.
The second approach in Turner permits a miner to demonstrate pretext by
showing that the operator’s non-discriminatory reasons were not substantial
enough to motivate the adverse action.71 The miner must rely on circumstantial
evidence that in the absence of protected activity, the miner would not have
suffered the adverse action. In practical terms, a fact-finder can determine the
substantiality of the operator’s non-discriminatory reasons by assessing several
factors. The presiding administrative law judge must assess: 1) whether the
miner’s past work record, including his past disciplinary record, was satisfactory;
2) whether the miner had received any prior warnings for the misconduct at issue;
3) whether the operator introduced any evidence of prior consistent discipline; and
4) any other relevant circumstantial evidence.72 Other relevant circumstantial
evidence include evidence by the operator that the miner’s misconduct damaged its
reputation and evidence by the miner that the operator failed to consistently
espouse the same non-discriminatory reasons as a basis for the adverse action.
At the first tier, the fact-finder assesses the credibility of each nondiscriminatory reason proffered by the operator. At this tier, independent reasons
provide an advantage to employers. If the reasons are independent, the falsity of
one reason may not impeach the credibility of other reasons. Therefore, a plaintiff
must discredit each of the individual reasons to show pretext. Conversely, an
employer need only demonstrate that one of its reasons is credible to avoid a
70

In Turner, the Review Commission considered whether the miner violated a
consistently enforced company policy under the second approach, which relates to
substantiality. However, as indicated above, the miner’s violation of a formal or
informal company policy should be considered when assessing the credibility of
each reason for an adverse action. Turner, 33 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 1076-77.
71
72

Turner, 33 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 1073-1077.

Id.; see also Bradley v. Belva Coal Co., 4 F.M.S.H.R.C. 982, 993 (1982)
(providing the operator can demonstrate the substantiality of an affirmative defense
“by showing, for example, past discipline consistent with that meted out to the
alleged discriminate, the miner’s unsatisfactory past work record, prior warnings to
the miner, or personnel rules or practices forbidding the conduct in question”).
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finding of pretext. However, if the reasons are cumulative, the falsity of one
reason impeaches the credibility of the remaining reasons. Therefore, a plaintiff
can demonstrate pretext by simply discrediting one of the reasons. Conversely, an
employer must demonstrate that all of its reasons are credible.
At the second tier, the fact-finder assesses the substantiality of the operator’s
affirmative defense. At this tier, cumulative reasons provide an advantage to
employers. Cumulative reasons are treated as a group when analyzing an
affirmative defense since all such reasons, in combination, were the basis for, or
motivated, the adverse action. Therefore, if the reasons are cumulative, a plaintiff
must show pretext by demonstrating that the combined reasons are not substantial
enough to support the adverse action. Conversely, the employer can avoid a
finding of pretext by simply demonstrating that the reasons, when combined, are
substantial enough to motivate the adverse action. However, if the reasons are
independent, the plaintiff can demonstrate pretext by simply showing that each
reason is not “independently sufficient” to motivate the adverse action.73
Conversely, the employer must demonstrate that one of its reasons is substantial
enough, by itself, to motivate the adverse action.
Therefore, depending on the scenario, an employer has an incentive to frame
its non-discriminatory reasons as either independent or cumulative.74 When one of
the proffered non-discriminatory reasons is false, or otherwise suspect, an
employer has an incentive to frame the reasons as independent. In this regard, one
false independent reason may not impeach the credibility of another reason. When
each proffered reason is insufficient by itself to motivate the adverse action, an
employer has an incentive to frame the reasons as cumulative. In this regard, the
fact-finder assesses whether the cumulative reasons, when combined, are
substantial enough to motivate the adverse action.
Furthermore, an employer will be able to retroactively characterize its
reasons as independent or cumulative to secure a strategic advantage, regardless of
the decision-maker’s initial viewpoint. For example, a decision-maker may not
initially view any of the proffered non-discriminatory reasons as being
73

Pendley v. Fed. Mine Safety and Health Review Comm’n, 601 F.3d 417, 425
(6th Cir. 2010).
74

If an employer proffers a single non-discriminatory reason for the adverse
action, the employer will not gain any advantage by characterizing the reason as
independent or cumulative. The single reason must be credible and substantial
enough by itself to motivate the adverse action.
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independently sufficient for the adverse action. In other words, the decision-maker
may view the multiple reasons as being cumulative bases for the adverse action.
However, one of the reasons is clearly false or otherwise suspect. Therefore, at
trial, the employer would have a strong incentive to retroactively frame the reasons
as independent regardless of the decision-maker’s initial viewpoint.
As discussed previously, the decision-maker’s initial viewpoint dictates
whether the proffered non-discriminatory reasons are independent or cumulative.
In the above example, the plaintiff’s ability to show that the non-discriminatory
reasons are cumulative, rather than independent, hinges on the decision-maker’s
statements at the time of discipline, the structure of the letter of discipline, and the
decision-maker’s testimony at trial.75 Normally, however, the decision-maker’s
generic statements when he issued the adverse action and the generic structure of
letters of discipline76 will not indicate whether he viewed the reasons as
independent or cumulative. Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that the decisionmaker’s testimony at trial will support the employer’s retroactive characterization
of its non-discriminatory reasons. Therefore, barring a contradiction in the
decision-maker’s testimony at trial, the presiding administrative law judge will be
forced to accept the employer’s retroactive characterization.
The employer certainly has strong incentives to strategically frame its nondiscriminatory reasons as independent or cumulative, depending on the
circumstances. However, these incentives come with corresponding disincentives.
As discussed, the first tier assesses the credibility of each reason while the second
tier assesses the substantiality of the overall affirmative defense. Independent
reasons provide employers an advantage at the first tier, but a disadvantage at the
second. Conversely, cumulative reasons provide employers a disadvantage at the
first tier, but an advantage at the second. As long as an employer is trading an
advantage at one tier for a disadvantage at another, the employer’s ability to
manipulate the framework will be limited.
A loophole arises whenever it is likely that the fact-finder will not find
pretext at one of the two tiers, regardless of how the non-discriminatory reasons
are characterized. In such a scenario, the employer can strategically characterize
75
76

See Pendley, 601 F.3d at 425-426.

In this regard, it is reasonable to infer that the letter of discipline will follow a
boiler plate format, simply listing the non-discriminatory reasons in bullet points
without indicating whether any of the reasons are independent bases for the
adverse action.
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its non-discriminatory reasons to secure an advantage at one tier without suffering
a corresponding disadvantage at the other.
For example, an employer may offer two non-discriminatory reasons, the
first of which is clearly credible and sufficient by itself to motivate the adverse
action. However, the second reason is of questionable credibility. Since one of the
reasons is substantial enough by itself to motivate the adverse action, a plaintiff
will be unable to demonstrate pretext at the second tier regardless of how the
reasons are framed. In this scenario, by framing both reasons as independent, the
employer can also avoid a finding of pretext at the first tier. In other words, the
employer can ensure that even if the second reason is discredited, the credibility of
the first reason will not be impeached.
Therefore, an employer may manipulate the dichotomy between independent
and cumulative reasons when establishing an affirmative defense to a claim of
retaliation under the Mine Act. If the reasons are alternative and independent, the
employer must show that a single reason is credible and sufficient by itself to
motivate the adverse action. If the reasons are cumulative, the employer must
show that all reasons are credible, and when combined, are sufficient to motivate
the adverse action. In certain scenarios, employers may be able to utilize a
loophole in the dichotomy between independent and cumulative reasons to
establish their affirmative defense. And as compared to other federal nondiscrimination statutes, if an employer establishes an affirmative defense under the
Mine Act, it has not engaged in any discrimination and avoids all liability for the
adverse action.
Prior to the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Pendley v. FMSHRC, the
Commission lacked bright line rules regarding the credibility of an employer’s
multiple non-discriminatory reasons for an adverse action. The Review
Commission had not distinguished between independent or cumulative reasons, or
suggested that all reasons should be treated as independent (only one reason need
be credible) or cumulative (all reasons must be credible).77 In the absence of bright
line rules, it is reasonable to infer that administrative law judges who found only
some of an operator’s non-discriminatory reasons to be credible formulated their
own various rules. Following the Sixth Circuit decision, however, two bright line
77

Instead, the Review Commission had merely held that an adverse action may be
sustained even if not all of the operator’s non-discriminatory reasons are adopted
by the judge. Pendley, 601 F.3d at 426 (citing Sec’y of Labor ex rel. Pendley v.
Highland Mining Co., 31 F.M.S.H.R.C. 61, 79 (2009)).
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rules replace this variation – an independent reason will not impeach the credibility
of other reasons, while a cumulative reason will impeach the credibility of the
entire affirmative defense.
III.B.

Resolution of the Loophole

As discussed, mine operators may manipulate the dichotomy between
independent and cumulative reasons for an adverse action. An operator may
strategically frame its non-discriminatory reasons as independent, even though the
decision-maker initially viewed them as cumulative. Alternatively, an operator
may strategically frame its reasons as cumulative, even though the decision-maker
initially viewed them as independent. As explained above, Commission judges
will be forced to accept the operator’s characterization of its proffered nondiscriminatory reasons.
Thus, the operator will be able to dictate whether its non-discriminatory
reasons are treated as independent or cumulative. In this regard, an operator may
retroactively frame its reasons as independent, regardless of the decision-maker’s
viewpoint, to preclude one false reason from impeaching the entire affirmative
defense. By strategically framing its non-discriminatory reasons as independent,
the operator can reduce its burden to establish an affirmative defense. However,
when a party strategically exploits a loophole to reduce its burden of proof, there is
a resulting imbalance in the burden-shifting framework of the Mine Act.
To rectify this imbalance, the Commission must incorporate the
“intertwined” exception, a principle briefly mentioned by the Sixth Circuit in the
context of other federal non-discrimination statutes.78 The principle of
“intertwined reasons” will prevent an operator from unilaterally dictating whether
the enumerated non-discriminatory reasons are treated as independent or
cumulative. Instead, if the fact-finder determines that the operator’s proffered nondiscriminatory reasons are intertwined, the reasons will be treated as cumulative
even if the operator frames them as independent.79 In other words, if the reasons

78

See generally Smith v. Chrysler Corp., 155 F.3d 799, 809 (6th Cir. 1998).

79

Id.
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are intertwined, the falsity of one “independent” reason will impeach the
credibility of the remaining reasons for the adverse action.80
In Smith v. Chrysler, a case decided under the Americans with Disabilities
81
Act, the Sixth Circuit set forth the principle of “intertwined” reasons.82 The court
recognized that if an employer proffers multiple “independent” reasons for an
adverse action, the general rule is that an employee must demonstrate that each
reason is false.83 However, the court also recognized an exception to the general
rule, holding that “there may be cases in which the multiple [independent reasons] .
. . are so intertwined . . . that the plaintiff could withstand summary judgment.”84
In this regard, the court implied that when the non-discriminatory reasons are
“intertwined,” the falsity of an independent reason will impeach the credibility of
the entire affirmative defense.85
A fact-finder who determines that an operator’s multiple non-discriminatory
reasons are “intertwined” may treat the reasons as cumulative. Instead of
subjectively determining whether the decision-maker initially viewed the reasons
as independent, an administrative law judge of the Commission merely has to
determine if the non-discriminatory reasons are intertwined based on objective
indicia. If the judge determines that the reasons are intertwined, the falsity of one
“independent” reason will impeach the credibility of the entire affirmative
defense.86 This will allow the plaintiff miner to demonstrate pretext at the first tier.
80

The opposite issue, i.e., when an employer wrongly frames its nondiscriminatory reasons as cumulative, when the decision-maker initially viewed the
reasons as independent, is beyond the scope of this paper.
81
82

42 U.S.C.A. § 12101 et seq. (2012).
Smith, 155 F.3d at 809.

83

Id. (citing Kariotis v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 131 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir.
1997)).
84

Id. (citing Russell v. Acme-Evans Co., 51 F.3d 64, 70 (7th Cir.1995)).

85

Id. (noting the court concluded that since the reasons at issue were not
intertwined, the falsity of one reason did not impeach the credibility of other
reasons. While not explicitly stated, the court implied that “intertwined” reasons
would have the opposite effect, i.e., the falsity of one reason would impeach all
other reasons for the adverse action).
86

A separate issue is whether intertwined reasons are treated as cumulative for the
purpose of the second tier, the substantiality analysis. In other words, if the non-

142

THE LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW FORUM

[VOL. 5:1

When an operator proffers multiple non-discriminatory reasons for an
adverse action, each reason generally reflects and cites a specific instance of
misconduct by the plaintiff miner.87 Such misconduct could range from
absenteeism to property damage to unsafe conduct to insubordination. The
operator will investigate each instance of misconduct before issuing a disciplinary
action to the miner. In the context of the Mine Act, the term “intertwined reasons”
should refer to “intertwined investigations” of each type of misconduct.
Investigations of misconduct may be intertwined when the decision-maker learned
of each type of misconduct, cited as a reason for the adverse action, from the same
source.
First, the presiding administrative law judge must determine how the
decision-maker learned of each type of misconduct. The decision-maker may have
first-hand knowledge of the misconduct, or may learn about it from company
documents, i.e., attendance records, pre-shift examination checklists, disciplinary
records, etc. If the decision-maker learned of each instance of misconduct from the
same source, it is likely that the non-discriminatory reasons are intertwined. For
example, if a miner is disciplined for tardiness and unexcused leave, and the
decision-maker learned of both types of misconduct from the miner’s attendance
record, the administrative law judge may find that the two reasons are intertwined.
Often however, the decision-maker will learn of each non-discriminatory
reason from other individuals. If the decision-maker is an upper-level management
official, he may learn of the misconduct through supervisors or other miners.88 If
the same supervisor reports each type of misconduct, it is likely that all nondiscriminatory reasons are intertwined. However, the administrative law judge
should also assess the supervisor’s source of knowledge regarding each type of
misconduct listed on the disciplinary action.
A supervisor could have first-hand knowledge of the plaintiff’s misconduct,
or learn of his misconduct from a company document or from another employee.
discriminatory reasons are found to be intertwined, does the fact-finder assess
whether each individual reason, or whether the combined reasons, are substantial
enough to motivate the adverse action? This issue is beyond the scope of this
paper, and will not be addressed further.
87

As discussed above, this paper focuses on a specific type of adverse action –
disciplinary actions which result from a plaintiff’s misconduct.
88

If the decision-maker is also the plaintiff’s immediate supervisor, then the factfinder need only assess the decision-maker’s source of knowledge.
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If a single supervisor reported the non-discriminatory reasons to the decisionmaker, but the supervisor learned of each type of misconduct from a separate
source, it is unclear if the multiple non-discriminatory reasons are intertwined. In
such a scenario, the fact-finder must use his own discretion to determine if the
reasons are intertwined.
In the future, the Review Commission may specify additional indicia of
“intertwined” reasons. For the present, administrative law judges of the
Commission should assess the decision-maker’s source of knowledge when
determining whether an operator’s multiple non-discriminatory reasons are
intertwined.

PART IV: POTENTIAL BROAD APPLICABILITY
The preceding pages have considered whether, under the Mine Act, a
plaintiff can demonstrate that an employer’s affirmative defense is pretextual by
only discrediting some of the enumerated non-discriminatory reasons. The issue
has broad relevance to other federal non-discrimination statutes that permit
employers to avoid some or all liability by establishing an affirmative defense.
Hoping to address this issue, the Sixth Circuit has created two bright line
rules regarding the impact of independent or cumulative reasons on the credibility
of an affirmative defense. The court’s distinction between independent and
cumulative reasons was developed in Sims v. Cleland and Pendley v. FMSHRC.
Sims was decided under Title VII, while Pendley was decided under the Mine Act.
In Pendley, the Sixth Circuit drew on principles laid down in Sims to promulgate
rules regarding independent and cumulative reasons. Furthermore, there was no
indication that these rules would only apply to the Mine Act. Given the continuing
influence of Sims, the Sixth Circuit’s rules may be broadly applicable to other
federal non-discrimination statutes.
Under the Mine Act, an employer may manipulate the dichotomy between
independent and cumulative reasons for an adverse action. The employer has an
incentive, depending on the scenario, to retroactively frame its non-discriminatory
reasons as independent or cumulative. By strategically characterizing its reasons,
an employer may be able to secure an advantage at the first tier, or the second tier,
of the affirmative defense stage. These two tiers assess the credibility of each nondiscriminatory reason and the substantiality of the overall affirmative defense
respectively. The two tiers are derived from a Sixth Circuit decision adjudicating a
case under another federal non-discrimination statute. Therefore, the two tiers may
perhaps be used to evaluate affirmative defenses under other federal statutes.
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The Commission may be able to prevent employers from manipulating the
dichotomy between independent and cumulative reasons. In this regard, the
Review Commission must incorporate the principle of “intertwined reasons” as an
exception to the general Sixth Circuit rule regarding independent reasons. The
principle of “intertwined reasons” has its genesis in a Sixth Circuit decision,
rendered under another federal statute, the Americans with Disabilities Act.
Therefore, the concept of intertwined reasons may apply to other federal statutes.
Based on prior decisions by the Sixth Circuit, it is reasonable to speculate
that the principles behind independent and cumulative reasons may apply to other
federal non-discrimination statutes. In this regard, it is possible that employers,
when defending claims of discrimination under such statutes, may be able to utilize
a similar loophole. Furthermore, it is conceivable that other federal courts could
utilize the “intertwined” exception to resolve such a loophole.

PART V:

CONCLUSION

In the preceding pages, this paper has sought to address a core issue
regarding an employer’s defense to a claim of workplace discrimination. The issue
can be phrased as a simple question – can a plaintiff discredit an employer’s
affirmative defense by simply discrediting some, not all, of the non-discriminatory
reasons proffered by the employer as a justification for the adverse action? Given
the United States Supreme Court’s silence on this subject, we must look to the
United States Courts of Appeals for an answer.
The Sixth Circuit has attempted to provide an answer, but in so doing, has
introduced a distinction between “alternative and independent” and “cumulative”
reasons for an adverse action. There are incentives for an employer, depending on
the factual circumstances in each case, to frame its non-discriminatory reasons as
either independent or cumulative, and thus manipulate the dichotomy for his own
advantage. It is thus clear that the framework of independent and cumulative
reasons adds a degree of complexity to courts’ analysis of claims of employment
discrimination. In this regard, the paper may serve as a guide to courts, which seek
to navigate the dichotomy of independent and cumulative reasons for an adverse
action.

